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441 
COMPETITION POLICY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT  
SEPTEMBER 17-20, 2002, BEIJING†
ULRICH IMMENGA*
MERGER CONTROL IN EUROPE AND GERMANY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
While there are numerous recent developments in the field of merger 
control in both Europe and Germany that might be examined, this Essay 
will explore the field generally without addressing the case law—an 
approach that seems fitting given the international character of this 
symposium. To this end, I focus on four points of general interest that 
concern issues inherent to merger law: (1) identifying the most appropriate 
test to assess the desirability of mergers; (2) determining the role of 
efficiency in merger assessment; (3) solving the common conflict between 
competition law and industrial policy in merger cases with an emphasis on 
the German solution; and (4) evaluating merger control in small, 
developing countries. 
The European Commission (“Commission”) explored the relevant 
substantive test of merger control and the role of efficiency in its Green 
Paper of December 2001, which is a publication that sparked an intensive 
and lively discussion.1 This Essay will briefly summarize and assess the 
principle arguments stemming from that discussion. 
I. THE RELEVANT SUBSTANTIVE TEST OF MERGER CONTROL: 
DOMINANCE VS. SUBSTANTIAL LESSENING OF COMPETITION (SLC) 
Article Two of the EC Merger Regulation (“ECMR”) relies on the 
dominance test. The Green Paper compares this test to the substantial 
lessening of competition test used in many jurisdictions, notably the 
United States. Both procedural and substantive reasons have been 
advanced for a reevaluation of the appropriateness of these tests.2
 
 
 † Due to circumstances beyond this Law Review's control, we have relied on the integrity of 
this Author for all citations provided herein.  
 * Professor of Law, doctor honoris causa, University of Göttingen. 
 1. Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation 4064/89, COM(01)745 final [Green 
Paper], available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/gpr/2001/com2001_0745en01.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2004). 
 2. See Ulf Böge & Edith Müller, From the Market Dominance Test to the SLC Test: Are There 
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From a procedural viewpoint, the main reason proposed in favor of a 
test reevaluation is that it could allow an alignment of the Merger 
Regulation’s appraisal criteria with those applied in other major 
jurisdictions, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia—
jurisdictions that rely on “the SLC test.”3 The creation of a global standard 
for merger assessment holds a certain attraction. It would, for example, 
simplify the assessment by merging parties of possible competition issues 
arising from contemplated transactions in an international context by 
obviating the current need to argue each case according to the different 
tests.4 This simplification would in turn provide agencies charged with 
reviewing competition with a better basis on which to build effective 
cooperation in cases involving more than one jurisdiction. Moreover, as a 
common test would tend to draw attention to the application of the test, 
rather than to the test itself, it would ultimately provide for better bench-
marking of the activities of competition authorities and courts, as well as 
facilitating the development of competition-oriented research and 
modeling. 
From a substantive viewpoint, there are many similarities between the 
dominance test and the SLC test.5 Both tests, for example, involve an 
investigation into the scope of the relevant market, an assessment of how 
the market will be affected by the proposed concentration, and a 
determination as to which competitive constraints would bind the merged 
entity. It should also be noted that, despite the current difference in legal 
tests, the vast majority of cases dealt with by the Commission and the 
major jurisdictions using the SLC test have revealed a significant degree 
of convergence in the systems’ approaches to merger analysis.6
It has been argued that the SLC test is a more appropriate standard 
because of its consideration of economic factors, which is a requirement 
that avoids the legal “straitjacket” of establishing dominance. 
 
 
Any Reasons for a Change, 23 (10) E.C.L.R. 495, 498 (2002); Kai-Uwe Kühn, Reforming European 
Merger Review Targeting Problem Areas in Policy Outcomes, 2 J. INDUS. COMPETITION & TRADE 
311, 335 (2002); INGO SCHMIDT, WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB-ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DEUTSCHES UND 
EUROPÄISCHES WETTBEWERBS, KARTELL-, UND FUSIONSRECHT 155 (2003). 
 3. David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Demand Side Efficiencies in Merger Control, 26(2) 
World Competition 167 (2003); Charles Miller, UK Competition Policy Reform: Impact of the Latest 
Proposals on Processes and Influences, 23(2) E.C.L.R. 68 (2002); MARKUS BURGSTALLER, 
WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB 726 (2003). 
 4. Wolfgang Von Meiborn & Andreas Geiger, A World Competition Law as an Ultima Ratio, 
23(9) E.C.L.R. 445 (2002); J. William Rowley QC, Omar K. Wakil & A. Neil Campbell, Streamlining 
International Merger Control, presented at EC Merger Control 10th Anniversary Conference 3 
(2000). 
 5. Böge & Müller, supra note 2, at 498. 
 6. See generally supra note 4. 
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Furthermore, the dominance test is considered to be too focused on static 
structural considerations such as corporate size or industry concentration, 
and does not allow for sufficient consideration of dynamic and behavioral 
factors.7 It has been pointed out that, while the dominance test has been 
successfully applied to some cases involving coordinated effects, the SLC 
test is nonetheless better suited to the type of analysis that these cases 
necessitate.8
In general, it is believed that the SLC test is more flexible, and as a 
result, can better accomodate an effects analysis based on more 
sophisticated microeconomic tools, instruments, and models developed 
through econometric and industrial organization research. 
German experts, from the Monopolies Commission9 and Federal Cartel 
Office (FCO),10 to national scholars in the field,11 oppose international 
adoption of an SLC type test. These groups argue that in principle, there 
are no substantive differences between the tests, and therefore, there are no 
convincing reasons for changing the prohibition criteria from the market 
dominance test to the SLC test. 
As evidenced by an analysis carried out by the Bundeskartellamt 
(German Federal Cartel Office) for the Conference of the Working Group 
on Cartel Law held in 2001,12 both criteria ultimately pursue the same 
primary objective: the prevention of undesirable market power. In defining 
SLC, both U.S. and Australian Merger Guidelines, for example, refer to 
the concept of market power. Market power, in turn, is defined as the 
possibility of acting differently from what would be expected under the 
conditions of effective competition.13 It appears then, that the SLC test 
assesses precisely the “scope of action which is not sufficiently controlled 
from a competition point of view” that is typically used to define a 
dominant position in European merger control.14 It logically follows that 
the two criteria do not differ significantly in terms of their substantive 
content—both allow concentrations to be analyzed in a rigorous, flexible, 
and effective manner. 
 
 
 7. Green Paper 37, supra note 1; HILDEBRAND, WORLD COMPETITION 3 (2002). 
 8. INGO SCHMIDT, WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB (2003); METTE ALFTER, WIRTSCHAFT UND 
WETTBEWERB 20 (2003). 
 9. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten XIV (2000/2001) 325 (2002). 
 10. Infra note 12. 
 11. STEFAN VOIGT & ANDRÉ SCHMIDT, WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB 899 (2003). 
 12. Bundeskartellamt, Comparative Study, Fall 2001, available at http://www.bundeskartellamt. 
de\discussion_papers.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2004). 
 13. VOIGT & SCHMIDT, supra note 11.  
 14. Id. 
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Convergence, however, is not the only point that must be addressed. 
While the SLC test might be inherently more flexible, it is a more 
uncertain standard. This uncertainty may well result in lower thresholds 
that would, in turn, allow the Commission unacceptably broad discretion 
in its analysis of merger cases. 
Another essential point is the serious practical drawbacks that will 
follow as a consequence of a change to the SLC test. These drawbacks 
affect industry and legal practitioners, as well as the Commission and 
European courts. At least initially, the change could result in a degree of 
uncertainty or unpredictability about how exactly the new standard would 
be interpreted. Decades of dominance test application by both the 
Commission and European courts has resulted in a considerable body of 
precedential case law, in both Germany and Europe in general, involving 
the dominance test.15 These experiences would become, at least to some 
extent, moot. In addition, many member States of the European Union and 
most of the EU accession candidate countries have aligned their 
substantive merger control provisions with the dominance test.16 It is clear 
then that while a change to the SLC standard would facilitate convergence 
with some jurisdictions, it could also result in a counterproductive degree 
of disunity among the EU’s national regimes. 
Despite their similarities, however, cases such as GE/Honeywell17 
make it clear that the tests possess a number of differences as well. These 
differences are unavoidable even where there is close cooperation between 
the agencies concerned.18 However, these differences are not necessarily a 
result of the application of different substantive tests, but perhaps of 
differences in the economic theories applied, or the parties’ principle 
objectives of competition policy.19
II. MERGER CONTROL AND EFFICIENCY DEFENSE  
The efficiency defense allows a merger to proceed when the benefits to 
the economy resulting from the greater efficiency are deemed to outweigh 
 
 
 15. Id.; Doris Hildebrand, The Eupopean School in EC Competition Law, 25(1) WORLD 
COMPETITION 3 (2002). 
 16. See IMMENGA & MESTMÄCKER (EDS.), 1 EG WETTBEWERBSRECHT 789 (1997). 
 17. General Electric/Honeywell, COMP/M.2220 (July 3, 2001). 
 18. Yusaf Akbar, Grabbing Victory from the Jaws of Defeat: Can the GE/Honeywell Merger 
Facilitate International Antitrust Co-operation, 25(4) WORLD COMPETITION 403 (2002); Larry 
Fullerton & Camelia C. Mazard, International Antitrust Co-operation Agreements, 24(3) WORLD 
COMPETITION 405 (2001). 
 19. For a focus on trade liberalization, see Andrew D. Mitchell, Broadening the Vision of Trade 
Liberalisation: International Competition Law and the WTO, 24(3) WORLD COMPETITION 343 (2001). 
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the harm suffered by the economy from reduced competition. U.S. merger 
control is moving, at least to a certain extent, in this direction. Under the 
EC Merger Regulation, however, the issue of efficiency has been raised in 
only a limited number of decisions, chief among them, the case of 
GE/Honeywell.20 There is a clear relationship between the efficiency 
defense and the substantive test, however it is difficult to reconcile this 
defense with the dominance test.21
Any discussion of the relevance of the efficiency defense requires a 
brief examination of its conception. This conception appears in the 
application of U.S. merger control, however, a discussion of this 
conception is not within the scope of this Essay. Instead, the following 
discussion is restricted to the relevant provisions of the horizontal Merger 
Guidelines issued by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, 
which were revised in 1997.22
The potential conflict between efficiency and competition is known as 
the “Williamson tradeoff.”23 According to the standard defense of 
efficiency, efficiency gains can outweigh competitive losses from mergers. 
The Merger Guidelines expressly consider efficiency in Section Four. This 
so-called “efficiency section” was the primary target of the revisions of the 
Guidelines’ in 1997. The revised Guidelines set out, for the first time in 
great detail the policies applied by both the Antitrust Division and the FTC 
in analyzing efficiency claims in mergers.24
The new Section Four begins with a general recognition of merger-
related efficiency, stating that “mergers have the potential to generate 
significant efficiencies by permitting a better utilization of existing assets, 
enabling the combined firm to achieve lower costs in producing a given 
quantity and quality than either firm could have achieved without the 
proposed transaction.”25 This declaration appears to indicate that the 
Guidelines are adopting a broad definition of the potentially pro-
competitive effects of mergers. It seems to follow then that the 
Government will accept all types of merger-related efficiency as long as 
they result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced services, or new 
 
 
 20. Eleanor M. Fox, Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and the Future of Merger 
Control, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 457, 458 (2002). 
 21. Fabienne Ilzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn, European Merger Control: Do We Need an 
Efficiency Defence?, 3 J. INDUS. COMPETITION & TRADE 57 (2003). 
 22. FTC 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines with 1997 revisions, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/ 
horizmer.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2004). 
 23. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 501 (West Pub. Co. 2d ed. 1999). 
 24. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 130 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 2001). 
 25. Fox, supra note 20. 
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products. A footnote makes clear, however, that the agencies deem 
efficiency that affects marginal costs more likely to be cognizable than 
other types of efficiency. Greater weight is thus given to short-term 
efficiency than to any claimed long-term cost savings, although the 
Guidelines state that delayed efficiency gains will be taken into account.26  
The Guidelines also refer to efficiency which will be considered in 
merger cases. This “merger-specific” efficiency is efficiency “likely to be 
accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished 
in the absence of either the proposed merger or other means having 
comparable anti-competitive effects”.27 The agencies therefore fail to 
consider pro-competitive efficiency that would likely occur without the 
proposed transactions, for example, through plain cost cutting, joint 
venture, licensing, or divestiture.28 As it is difficult to define efficiencies 
with complete specificity, and as there is theoretically always the 
possibility to pursue increased internal growth as a least restrictive 
alternative to a proposed merger, the Guidelines point to a focus on the 
practical alternatives merging firms face in their specific business 
situations.29
The burden of proof rests with the merging firms. They must be able to 
explain: how, when, and at what cost the efficiency will be achieved; why 
the cost savings are merger-specific; the likelihood and magnitude of 
claimed efficiency likely to result from the merger; and how the efficiency 
will affect the merged firm’s ability or incentive to compete. 
When weighing such efficiency, the agencies will offset the resultant 
benefits by the costs associated with the merger and with obtaining the 
savings. It is only the net efficiency that is, therefore, balanced against any 
adverse competitive effects. The agencies will not challenge a proposed 
merger if the cognizable efficiencies are of such a type and magnitude that 
they would offset the merger’s potential harm to consumers in the relevant 
market. In conducting the overall analysis, the agencies evaluate whether 
the benefits from any efficiency is sufficient to prevent price increases to 
relevant consumers. This means, in effect, another tradeoff. On the sole 
condition of sufficient remaining competition, advantages resulting from 
efficiency must be balanced against consumer welfare—this is a serious 
 
 
 26. HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, at 504. 
 27. Fox, supra note 20. 
 28. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED 
HANDBOOK 608 (2000). 
 29. Fox, supra note 20. 
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restriction. It is interesting to note that Article Two of the EC Merger 
Regulation contains an identical restriction.30
It is questionable whether or not the EC Merger Regulation provides a 
legal basis for its consideration of efficiency benefits likely to result from 
a proposed merger. The issue is only referenced in the second part of the 
dominance test in Article Two, sections two and three (referring to a 
significant impediment to competition) and section one (subpart b) 
(referring to a consideration in an assessment of a concentration of the 
interests of intermediate and ultimate customers, and the development of 
technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers’ 
advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition). 
The Commission, in general, has failed to utilize Article Two in the 
development of a real efficiency defense. In my view, there are two 
arguments against such an application. First, the very existence of a 
second part of the dominance test in Article Two is controversial in and of 
itself. Second, the encouragement of technical and economic progress is 
one of the criterion used to assess market dominance but not to justify 
market dominance. As a result, Article Two has also been interpreted to 
support an “efficiency offence,” allowing the Commission to argue that 
the efficiencies resulting from the merger are likely to have the effect of 
reducing or eliminating competition in the relevant market. If any 
efficiency considerations were advanced, the Commission generally 
countered their value through an invocation of the text regarding technical 
and economic progress and consumer advantage. The Commission asserts 
that this latter requirement is not fulfilled if there is a dominant position 
that prevents the passage of advantages on to consumers.31
Initial reactions to the Green Paper were mostly favorable. The 
arguments advanced were generally in line with criteria, which were 
developed in conjunction with the U.S. model. Furthermore, it had been 
stressed that merger-specific efficiencies are only those that are achieved 
by the merger and not by other means, for example, through cooperation. 
Nevertheless, any consideration of efficiencies in the European context 
should be clarified by altering the wording of the substantive test—not the 
dominance test—and through the introduction of clear additional text. 
Another aspect of this discussion is a focal point in German circles. 
The German Monopolies Commission has observed that efficiency should 
be generally related to, or at least an aim of, merger activities; these are 
 
 
 30. Commission Regulation 4064/89; WISH’S COMPETITION LAW BOOK 728 (4th ed. 2001). 
 31. Case No.IV/M.53/Aèrospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland 2001 O.J. (L 334) 42. 
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standard cost-saving synergies, and are considered to be the basis of 
merger control.32 Merger control and control of anti-competitive 
agreements, however, differs considerably with regard to the presumed 
impact on competition. The spectrum of tests to determine merger control 
ranges from that of assessing horizontal agreements to that of assessing 
market dominance. The latter test allows for a much higher degree of anti-
competitive effects.33 With regard to competition policies, this difference 
is justified by the inherent economic advantages generally expected to 
result from mergers—the built-in efficiencies. Any efficiency defense 
might, therefore, be justified in only the rarest of cases if there are not only 
standard synergies, but those going above and beyond as well, such as 
technological advantages or innovation. This line of argument generally 
fails to consider efficiency in the merger context, save in extreme cases 
where an exception might be justified. In order to avoid uncertain and 
often unfounded discussions revolving around efficiency in myriad 
individual cases, these exceptions should not be incorporated into merger 
law. 
III. INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND MERGER CONTROL 
The Report of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Working Group 
on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the General 
Council recognizes the limits of competition laws, particularly with regard 
to political interests that may conflict with market-oriented legislation.34 
The Report included discussion regarding the appropriate measures needed 
to address tacit and explicit government policies tolerating and 
encouraging anti-competitive practices, or the consideration given to 
factors other than “pure” competition concerns in merger evaluation.35 
National competition laws identify international competitiveness as a goal. 
Furthermore, it was stated that implementation of a merger control system 
might, at least in economies still adjusting to foreign competition, create 
an obstacle to beneficial rationalization and discourage foreign direct 
investment. 
 
 
 32. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten XIV (2000/2001) 326 (2002). 
 33. MESTMÄCKER & VEELKEN, GWB KOMMENTAR § 36 n.19 (Immenga & Mestmäcker eds., 3d 
ed. 2001). 
 34. Document WT/WGTCP/2 (98-4914). 
 35. Id. 
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These issues are widely discussed in Europe, particularly within the 
European Community and Germany, under the heading “Industrial Policy 
and Competition Policy.”36
The politicalization of the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas case37 
effectively illuminates the topics of industrial policy and competition 
policy.38 This case involved the merger of two U.S. companies. While the 
companies’ productive assets were confined to the United States,39 the 
market for their large passenger jets was most certainly global. The merger 
was to result in a market share of sixty-five percent for the newly merged 
company (sixty percent Boeing; five percent McDonnell-Douglas), with 
European Airbus holding roughly thirty percent of the remaining 
marketshare. The Federal Trade Commission authorized the merger on 
competition grounds, however, the Commission very nearly prohibited the 
transaction. This contradictory appraisal could have resulted in a trans-
Atlantic trade war between the United States and the European Union. The 
U.S. Government feared the effects of merger prohibition on its defense 
industry and labor markets, and it presented these concerns to the 
Commission.40 These arguments contributed mightily to the Commission’s 
decision to stay away from a more severe intervention into the merger. It 
did, however, impose several conditions aimed at the merger’s exclusive-
dealing arrangements. The U.S. Government rebuked these conditions as 
the Commission’s attempt to bolster European Airbus.41
This type of conflict between industry interests and the application of 
competition policy may arise on the national level as well. Case in point is 
Germany’s Daimler-Benz/MBB merger42—initiated by the German 
Government. The FCO barred the merger on pure competition grounds, 
arguing that it would have allowed the new company to become the 
dominant force in several defense-related markets, particularly, the air and 
space industry. The FCO expressly stated that it would not consider any 
criteria that were not related to competition.43 Ultimately, however, the 
 
 
 36. Ulrich Immenga, Conflicts Between Competition Policy and Industrial Policy, in TOWARDS 
WTO COMPETITION RULES 343 (Roger Zäch ed., 1999). 
 37. Case No.IV/M.877-Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16. For a detailed 
discussion, see William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas 
Merger and International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805 (2001). 
 38. Fox, Antitrust Report 20 (Nov. 1997). 
 39. Immenga, supra note 36. 
 40. HIRSBRUNNER, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 390 (1999). 
 41. Kovacic, supra note 37. 
 42. Monopolkommission, Sondergutachten 18 (1989), Bundeskartellamt, 2335 WuW/E BKartA; 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB 191 (1989). 
 43. Kovacic, supra note 37. 
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Federal Ecomomics Minister authorized the merger—an action completely 
in accord with the Minister’s official rights and duties under German law. 
The Minister cited international competitiveness, the creation of 
economies of scope, and the preservation of high technology labor as his 
rationale for the authorization. 
A further example in this context is the first prohibition of a merger by 
the Commission. In this matter, a French/Spanish joint venture (ATR) 
intended to acquire de Havilland, a Boeing subsidiary.44 The Commission 
refused to authorize this acquisition because it believed the merger would 
result in high shares in the turbo-aircraft market. In the aftermath, the 
French Government accused the Commission of failing to consider the 
predominant aspects of European and national interests in the aircraft 
industry.45 This line of cases representing “industrial policy” might easily 
be expanded, and it illustrates the enormous potential for conflicts between 
national or regional interests in specific industries. These conflicts may 
result in a tolerance of anti-competitive activities by firms in these 
industries. 
Merger law provisions are, at least in most EU Member States, more or 
less open to industrial policy considerations alongside competition policy. 
The texts range from a defense of public interest and international 
competitiveness concerns (e.g., in Spain and France),46 to an emphasis on 
technical and economic progress (e.g., in Spain, Portugal, and Belgium). 
The relationship of these concerns to competition criteria is determined in 
different ways. Beyond the relevant rules, one must consider that there are 
different institutions applying these rules among the various antitrust 
authorities and ministries. These patterns reflect the respective attention 
being payed to industrial policy if opposed to competition policy. 
Germany provides a specific and, with the exception of recent Swiss 
legislation, unique institutional solution. When merger control provisions 
were introduced in 1973, both the Minister of Economics and industry in 
general insisted that under certain sets of circumstances where paramount 
national interests are at stake, the Minister of Economics should be 
authorized to override a decision by the FCO to prohibit a merger. In 
response, the law was drafted in a manner that divides the competences 
between both institutions. The FCO is confined to a strict application of 
 
 
 44. See generally supra note 31. 
 45. Leonard Hawkes, The EC Merger Control Regulation: Not an Industrial Policy Instrument: 
The De Havilland Decision, 13(1) E.C.L.R. 34 (1992). 
 46. Lucie Carswell Parmentier, Reform of French Competition Law: Adoption of a Mandatory 
Pre-Merger Control Regime, 23(2) E.C.L.R. 99 (2002). 
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the relevant merger control criteria.47 In the aforementioned Daimler-
Benz/MBB case, for example, the FCO expressly refrained from any 
political considerations. The Minister of Economics, however, is 
empowered to authorize any FCO-prohibited merger on the condition that 
the negative anti-competitive effects of the merger are outweighed by 
general economic advantages, or justified by a predominant public 
interest. According to the text, this appraisal must also take into account 
the international competitiveness of the firms involved. In addition to 
these requirements, the independent German Monopolies Commission 
must be consulted by the Minister of Economics for its views on the case. 
This system similarly applies to prohibited cartels that may be authorized 
for public interest reasons by the Minister of Economics. 
This institutional solution obviously raises a host of pertinent 
questions. Is for example, this method a portal through which political 
influence can erode competition policy? To date the Minister of 
Economics has made little use of this authority, accepting that such power 
should only be employed under exceptional circumstances. As of 2001, 
there were 133 prohibitions of mergers and sixteen resulting demands for 
ministerial authorization. Of these demands, only six were granted, and 
most of these were subjected to a number of conditions.48 The Monopolies 
Commission positively assessed these decisions as well as the institutional 
separation of competitive and political criteria. 
To render this system truly viable, two preconditions must exist. First, 
the institutional process of decision-making must take place publicly. A 
prohibition by the FCO, for example, is published as well as the results of 
the Monopoly Commission’s consultation, and a public hearing precedes 
the decision of the Economics Minister. As a result, the Minister of 
Economics must articulate strong arguments in order to overcome 
considerations of free and unrestricted competition. The transparency of 
this institutional process keeps the public abreast of industrial 
developments and impedes the ability of political influence to dictate the 
outcome of merger assessments. Second, an equally important 
precondition is a basic understanding between the FCO’s and the Minister 
of Economic’s comprehension of the values and virtues of an open market 
system. In the German context, this coherence dates back to the first 
German Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, who strongly advocated a 
 
 
 47. The competition-related conclusions in the decision of the Bundeskartellamt are binding for 
the Minister’s decision, see MESTMÄCKER & VEELKEN, GWB KOMMENTAR § 42 n.29 (Immenga & 
Mestmäcker eds., 3d ed. 2001); Möschel, Betriebs Berater 2078 (2002). 
 48. MESTMÄCKER & VEELKEN, GWB KOMMENTAR, supra note 47, § 42 n.2. 
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competitive economic order and was one of the founders of Germany’s 
economic model, the social-market system.  
There has been some discussion as to whether this institutional model 
should be incorporated into European Community law through the 
creation of an independent antitrust authority requiring transfer of 
competence from the Commission (General Directorate IV on 
competition) and the institution of a second-level organ that can override 
prohibitions of the independent authority.49 This, however, is a subject I 
will not elaborate on in this Essay. 
Any adoption of the German model, however, requires the adoption of 
three conditions derived from the German experience to make it viable. 
First, the antitrust authority must be truly independent and act with 
antitrust experts nominated irrespective of any quorum. Second, 
institutions at both levels must have a basic and common understanding of 
the role of competition in the economy and society. Without this cohesive 
understanding, it is likely that all or most prohibited cases would result in 
a second-level assessment. Third, the entire process must be transparent in 
order to facilitate genuine and well-informed public participation. 
IV. GLOBAL COMPETITION AND NATIONAL MERGER CONTROL IN SMALL 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The above mentioned Report of the WTO Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy reveals a certain 
reluctance of smaller States, particularly developing countries, to 
implement merger control as a part of their competition laws.50 At first 
glance this attitude appears understandable. There is an underlying 
assumption that the generally small companies in these countries will not 
be in a position to compete in international markets until they reach a 
certain critical size. Confined to their small national markets, this growth 
seems impossible. Under these circumstances, the most logical move 
would be for these companies to combine with competitors in their 
national markets or in neighbouring states in order to reach the necessary 
dimensions required for competition abroad. The application of national 
merger control is thus considered an obstacle to development. 
This line of arguments is convincing if mergers will create companies 
that dominate national markets in the countries concerned and would, 
therefore, be prohibited; in practice this might reasonably be expected. In 
 
 
 49. Immenga, supra note 36. 
 50. Supra note 34. 
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such cases, however, it is the definition of the relevant geographic market 
that is the decisive point, whether the markets concerned are defined as 
national or international. If international competition is a firm’s concern, it 
should be assumed that the markets for its business activities are 
international—provided that there are no state barriers to cross-border 
trade—and if markets have to be defined as international, the firm’s of 
smaller countries will not generally dominate those markets. 
Consequently, there is no reason to believe that national merger control 
will result in wide-scale merger prohibition. The external growth of firms 
in small, developing countries will not be impeded by national merger 
control if the activities in question are related to international or even 
global markets. It must be noted that national companies that do not face 
serious competitive constraints from abroad will have their markets 
defined as national. The effects of a national merger would likely have a 
detrimental impact on national markets and at that point, it is the function 
of merger control to intervene. 
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